Ideas from 'The Question of Realism' by Kit Fine [2001], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Philosophers' Imprint' (ed/tr -) [- ,]].
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
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15053
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If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
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15054
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'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon)
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
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15007
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If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider]
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15006
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Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Sider]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
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15055
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Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
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15050
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Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form
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15051
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Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction
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15052
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Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence
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15056
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The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
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15060
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Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real?
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15046
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Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms
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15047
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What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground'
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15048
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In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental'
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
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15061
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Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
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15059
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Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
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15057
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Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
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15058
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A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value
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